We have noticed that left-wing groups have been increasingly affected by repression in recent weeks and months. State actors seem to be trying very hard to confiscate our smartphones. It is still unclear what they intend to do with them, but we can assume that there are currently efforts to investigate left-wing networks and groups and establish links between individuals. In this text, we want to look at what has happened in the past and ask readers to review their security principles.
State of surveillance & legal situation
Efforts are being made around the world to access our chat histories and movement profiles. Police authorities in the USA, for example, regularly ask Google which people were in a certain place at a certain time. One case that has become public is that of Zachary McCoy. Out of the blue, he received a letter from Google informing him that Google would hand over his account information to the police authorities. The reason: at the time of a robbery, McCoy was jogging near the scene of the crime and had his smartphone with him. This made him the main suspect in the investigation.
Within Europe and in Germany, there are equally specific laws and methods aimed at collecting information about us via our cell phones and smartphones. For example, the new Saxon police law has created opportunities to collect data not only from traditional providers such as internet or telephone providers, but also from online services such as Twitter, Google, Facebook and others. The anti-terror package introduced the **identification requirement when purchasing prepaid cards** in 2016. The aim is to make it more difficult to use anonymous phones. As a result, most phones are now directly linked to the operator’s ID card. This fact is also actively used: in 2014, government agencies checked who a telephone number belongs to a total of 7 million times. This now happens 21 million times a year. So three times as often. In the activist environment, people continue to operate phones with pre-registered SIM cards – so-called burner SIMs, which are not in their own name – but the proportion seems to be falling in our eyes.
Another technique of state surveillance that is aimed directly at our phones is the so-called “silent SMS”. This text message is not displayed when it is received, so you are not aware of it. Nevertheless, it generates a communication process that is logged by the respective telephone provider and can then be queried by police authorities. In this way, and by sending this silent text message several times, the police obtain an accurate movement profile in real time. Suspicions suggest that this method is used for arrests, among other things. Statistics show that 400 silent text messages were sent for certain measures in Schleswig-Holstein in 2019. With this technology, all you need to do is insert a phone with a SIM card, no matter how old it is.
Another technology in use is the so-called IMSI catcher. These are fake mobile phone masts that cops sometimes set up near demonstrations. The demonstrators’ phones then dial into these fake mobile phone masts. This allows the cops to know who is on site and also enables them to intercept phone calls and text messages. Such IMSI catchers were used at Pegida demonstrations in Dresden, among others.
All of these methods are specifically and purposefully aimed at the cell phones in our pockets. We haven’t even mentioned traditional telecommunications surveillance. Currently, we have to assume that the phones of activists from the Last Generation are being tapped, including in Dresden. This kind of eavesdropping has a wide impact: even if you are not in direct contact with people from the Last Generation, you may well be a so-called ‘third party’ for whatever reason and still be targeted by the surveillance measures. It is important to be aware of this and not to discuss any information about structures, actions or similar over the phone. And if the cops can’t get permission to spy on our devices remotely, there’s a much easier way to screen us completely and get full access to our private and activist lives: confiscating our smartphones!
300 cell phones confiscated on DayX alone
The state does not confiscate technical devices for fun or simply to take them away from us, but to analyze them and gather evidence against us. For these evaluations, police authorities buy software from private companies, such as the “Celebrite” software from the manufacturer of the same name. These are companies that specialize in evaluating smartphones. In the past, there have been repeated confiscations of devices from the activist environment, especially smartphones. For example, a phone was confiscated at the Anarchist May Day in Dresden. On TagX in Leipzig alone, 300 cell phones and smartphones were confiscated and these are now being “evaluated as evidence” (https://www.mdr.de/nachrichten/sachsen/leipzig/leipzig-leipzig-land/leipzig-polizei-zu-fehlern-demo-tagx-kessel-dritter-juni-100.html#sprung2). Cops tracked down a social worker from Saxony on the basis of a tweet and also confiscated his phone. Last week there were house searches in Gera on May 1st – smartphones were also confiscated there.
The reason is always the same: evidence needs to be secured. But a confiscated smartphone contains data that goes far beyond this. It is also absurd that the authorities do not keep statistics on how many smartphones they read. We have to assume that reading our devices without regard for our privacy will become the norm. If the analysis is successful, the cops will gain access to text messages, contacts, call histories, all media (images, videos, audio recordings), app data, files as well as hidden and deleted files. The amount of data we hand over to the authorities is enormous. You can bypass screen locks and comfortably view chat histories in various messengers. This makes it possible to create detailed networks of contacts. As many chat messengers today are linked to a telephone number, it is easy to determine the identity of individuals in various chat groups and sniff out members of entire political groups.
Nevertheless, it is common practice in left-wing circles to organize themselves via number-bound messengers on smartphones – the question arises as to whether we need to find a different approach in the future.
Check your security concepts!
The state is our enemy and our daily political work is fully directed against it. This is precisely why it is important not to give this bureaucratic apparatus of oppression a single meter of space. Not only on the streets, but also in the digital space. Activists all over the world are involved in a wide variety of struggles – and no matter how different their approaches may be, they are always united by the same point: they expose themselves to the risk of repression and sometimes face severe penalties. An important basic principle for remaining politically active in the long term and not ending up behind bars is the protection of one’s own anonymity. The actions and activities we carry out must not be associated with our “official” person. That’s why we need to protect the data we share with other activists. We must communicate securely and in encrypted form, not for fun, but to protect our own safety and that of our comrades.
In order to maintain our anonymity, we are dependent on the help of our fellow human beings: they must respect and honor it just as much as we do. The principles of mutual aid apply here as in all other areas of life. It must be part of a practice of solidarity to preserve the anonymity of our fellow human beings. The things we discuss, share and organize online are our business. And with every security risk we take, with every confiscated smartphone that contains sensitive information, we make room for our political opponents and lose a piece of freedom. We would therefore like to call on you to check the security concepts within your political groups. Check what information your cell phone reveals, what information would fall into the hands of the authorities through a house search and what could be avoided.
You are welcome to use our security guide: https://abcdd.org/security-guide/
Or this one: https://ssd.eff.org/
If you have any questions, please send us an e-mail.